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Abstract—The President of the United States, in signing Space 
Policy Directive-1, directed the NASA Administrator “to lead an 
innovative and sustainable program of exploration with 
commercial and international partners to enable human 
expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth 
new knowledge and opportunities. Beginning with missions 
beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO), the United States will lead the 
return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and 
utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other 
destinations.” NASA is charged to land American astronauts on 
the lunar South Pole in 2024 and to continue a campaign of 
sustainable lunar surface exploration in order to develop 
necessary technologies and capabilities to enable initial human 
missions to Mars. 
NASA’s lunar surface exploration plans are part of a continuum 
of activities utilizing platforms in low Earth orbit (LEO), 
cislunar space, and the lunar surface to demonstrate advanced 
technologies, advance operations concepts, and develop 
countermeasures to lessen the impacts of the space environment 
and long duration exposure on the crew working in space. 
NASA is using a capability-driven approach to identify critical 
gaps to be addressed as part of a focused program to reduce risk 
for future deep space exploration missions building to eventual 
human missions to the surface of Mars. Teams of discipline 
experts from across NASA identify capability gaps between the 
current state of the art and the needs of proposed exploration 
missions and develop integrated strategies and roadmaps for 
filling those gaps. These inputs include assessment of platform 
needs for demonstration and testing of new capabilities. 
Generally, the International Space Station (ISS) and Gateway 
are needed for demonstration of capabilities for Mars transit, 
while Lunar surface activities focus on development of 
capabilities and operational protocols for Mars surface. 
This paper discusses the activities required to advance critical 
exploration capabilities, focusing on selection of demonstration 
and test location based upon the unique environments and 
characteristics of the ISS, Gateway, and potential lunar surface 
assets.  The optimal strategy will be a combination of ISS/LEO, 
Gateway, and lunar surface testing; however, not all capabilities 
require all these steps on their path to deep space exploration 
missions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As NASA and the international spaceflight community 
develop plans to return to the Moon, it is valuable to develop 
those plans with the needs of future human Mars missions in 
mind. Understanding where capability needs for lunar 
missions can also address Mars mission needs enables a more 
efficient and sustainable build towards the ultimate goal of 
human exploration of Mars. 
This paper describes an overview of NASA’s human 
exploration campaign through a description of a phased 
exploration approach with capabilities to support those 
phases. A framework is presented that was used to develop 
the capability gaps. Architecture assumptions are presented 
that were used to derive the capability gaps. Results and 
conclusions are then provided to describe the demonstration 
and enabled platforms for the capability gaps. 
2. BACKGROUND  
In keeping with Space Policy Directive-1, NASA is charged 
with landing American astronauts at the South Pole of the 
Moon by 2024, followed by a long-term presence on and 
around the Moon, leading toward human missions to Mars 
[1]. This requires a new strategic approach by NASA, which 
is divided into distinct phases: Phase 1: ‘Initial Human Lunar 
Landing’; Phase 2: ‘Long-term Presence on the Lunar 
Surface’; and Exploration Architectures beyond Phase 2. For 
the purposes of this paper, the Exploration Architectures 
beyond Phase 2 are further differentiated into Phase 3: ‘Lunar 
Sustainability’, Phase 4: ‘Shakedown & Mars Orbital’, and 
Phase 5: ‘Mars Surface’. 
Phase 1: Initial Human Lunar Landing 
Phase 1 primarily focuses on the systems required to achieve 
the 2024 human landing. These systems are comprised of the 
Gateway, an Integrated Lander, an Extra-vehicular activity 
(EVA) suit, and the Exploration Systems Development 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20200001575 2020-03-28T19:16:10+00:00Z
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(ESD) Enterprise’s Space Launch System (SLS), Orion crew 
vehicle, and ground systems. The objective of Phase 1 is to 
send four crew to Gateway and land at least two crew at the 
South Pole of the Moon by 2024. This phase requires NASA 
and commercial partners to move forward in parallel to 
complete the human lunar architecture and deliver 
crewmembers to the lunar surface. Initially, Gateway will 
consist of a minimum configuration comprised of a Power 
and Propulsion Element (PPE), Habitation and Logistics 
Outpost (HALO), and Logistics Module (LM). 
Phase 2: Long-term Presence on the Lunar Surface 
Phase 2 primarily focuses on evolving Phase 1 systems for 
sustainability and long-term presence on the lunar surface 
after 2024. Expanding habitation on and around the Moon 
and deployment of surface systems will be a primary focus 
during this phase. The key functional capability in Phase 2 is 
extending the duration of total lunar vicinity missions beyond 
the Phase 1 goal of 30 days mission duration and 6.5 days on 
the lunar surface.  
Deployment of surface assets during this phase will support 
crew on the surface, potentially allowing for longer surface 
durations, including the ability to survive through eclipse 
periods at the South Pole. Staging surface missions from pre-
placed surface assets and pre-deploying consumables and 
other supplies will remove mass and other burdens on the 
descent element, allowing at least four crew to be delivered 
and supported on the surface. Surface habitation is expected 
to consist of mobile and/or stationary assets that provide 
improved capability including increased exploration range 
using unpressurized and pressurized roving vehicles. Two 
options are presented to include fixed habitation and mobile 
habitation. 
This period will also see augmentation of the Gateway to 
support lunar missions beyond 30 days total duration and 
future extended duration missions in cislunar space. This may 
include: addition of habitation element(s), utilization 
module(s), logistics element(s), extra-vehicular robotics, and 
an airlock element. These expansions will also enable testing 
of systems needed for long-duration Earth-independent 
operations, including multi-year missions to Mars.  
Exploration Beyond Phase 2 
Exploration architectures beyond Phase 2 primarily focuses 
on evolving Phase 2 systems, sustained presence in cislunar 
space and on the lunar surface, and assessing human 
exploration systems required for missions beyond the Earth-
Moon system, as well as missions to Mars.  These phases will 
continue to identify technology development needs for 
enabling sustainable missions to Mars. Integrated prototype 
systems for Mars exploration will be tested first on and 
around the Moon to reduce future mission risk. For additional 
granularity, this phase has been divided into additional 
phases, Phase 3: Lunar Sustainability, Phase 4: Shakedown 
and Mars Orbital, and Phase 5: Mars Surface. 
Phase 3: Lunar Sustainability—Phase 3 focuses on 
additional capabilities beyond Phase 2 to support sustainable 
lunar exploration.  The options presented trend toward past 
studies such as NASA’s Constellation Program Lunar 
Surface System approach [2] and International Space 
Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) Reference 
Architecture for Human Lunar Exploration [3], enabling 
longer durations and/or longer range mobility beyond Phase 
2. Similar to phase 2, the capabilities assume either a fixed or 
mobile habitation approach.  In addition, other capabilities 
may include in-situ resource utilization and additional 
surface power generation. 
Phase 4: Shakedown and Mars Orbital—The Mars 
operations concept includes a shakedown, or testing of the 
integrated Mars Spacecraft, in cislunar space prior to 
departure for Mars. The shakedown mission would be staged 
from Gateway to accomplish critical test objectives, such as 
gaining in-space flight time on exploration systems. It would 
also serve to reduce system risk by demonstrating the 
currently assumed Mars mission-class hybrid solar electric 
propulsion (SEP)-chemical propulsion and verifying the 
Mars Spacecraft system re-start after long periods of 
dormancy. The mission would provide further data on 
humans in a deep space environment by exposing them to 
long communication delays and ‘black out zones’ as well as 
regions that offer limited mission abort capabilities. The same 
Mars Spacecraft would be used for potential Mars orbital 
missions and future Mars surface missions. 
Phase 5: Mars Surface—In this phase, the goal is to place 
humans on the surface of Mars, leveraging all the previous 
testing and demonstration of capabilities. The same Mars 
Spacecraft used for the Shakedown and potential Mars orbital 
missions would be used to transport the crew to the Martian 
vicinity prior to landing. Additional capabilities needed 
include entry, descent, landing, and ascent systems along 
with surface infrastructure. Many of these capabilities will 
have been proven out prior to the crew landing on the surface 
of Mars. 
3. CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
Definitions 
The following definitions are used within the context of the 
framework and this activity. 
Capability: The ability to complete a task or meet an 
exploration objective through Architecture, Engineering, 
Technology, or Operations for a given set of constraints and 
level of risk. 
Capability Area: A group of functions that performs a similar 
task (i.e. propulsion, robotic systems, power and energy 
storage). The NASA Office of Chief Technologist (OCT) 
2020 NASA Technology Taxonomy was used for the 
capability areas [4]. 
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Capability Gap: The inability to complete a task or meet an 
exploration objective. The gap may be the result of no 
existing capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an 
existing capability solution, or the need to replace an existing 
capability solution to prevent a future gap.  
Technology: A solution that arises from applying the 
disciplines of science to synthesize a device, process, or 
subsystem, to enable a specific capability (definition from the 
NASA strategic technology investment plan). 
Mission: A major activity required to accomplish an Agency 
goal or to effectively pursue a scientific, technological, or 
engineering opportunity directly related to an Agency goal. 
Mission needs are independent of any particular system or 
technological solution. (definition from NASA Procedural 
Requirement 7120.5 [5]). 
Architecture: A set of functional capabilities, their translation 
into elements, their interrelations and operations. The 
architecture enables the implementation of various mission 
scenarios that achieve a set of given goals and objectives. 
Framework 
NASA is using a capability-driven approach to identify 
critical items to be addressed as part of a focused program to 
reduce risk for future deep space exploration missions 
building to eventual human missions to the surface of Mars.  
The process employed aims to ensure that the capabilities 
required to execute NASA’s human exploration plans are 
identified, along with strategies for filling those gaps. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, this involves two steps: i) defining the 
capability gaps, and ii) understanding the range of activities 
and closure pathways that are needed. 
Capability gaps are defined simply as the difference between 
the capabilities of current missions or platforms and the needs 
of planned future missions.  High-level mission requirements 
are defined by the human spaceflight architecture which takes 
into account national space policy, stakeholder 
considerations and NASA strategic guidance. Teams of 
discipline experts from across NASA review these mission 
requirements and identify capability needs within their 
capability area. They then articulate the gaps between the 
current state of the art and the capability needs of the 
proposed exploration missions. 
Once the capability gaps have been determined, the discipline 
experts further characterize by type, indicating possible 
closure via new technology development, engineering 
development, acquisition of new knowledge/science, or 
architectural trade studies. An additional possible closure 
route is development of operational procedures that mitigate 
a potential gap identified through this process.  Completion 
of architectural trade studies or new scientific results feed 
back into the capability needs and gaps articulation process 
and can eventually lead to determination that there are 
additional capability gaps. As gap closure routes are 
considered, testing needs to facilitate gap closure are also 
considered including selection of ideal test platform to 
demonstrate and validate new capabilities. Test platform 
requirements vary from standard engineering qualification 
testing conducted on the ground to flight tests conducted at 
ISS or on or around the Moon. 
Figure 1. Capabilities Integration Framework 
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4. ARCHITECTURE ASSUMPTIONS  
Architecture assumptions were provided for each of the 
phases described in Section 2 and for some of the phases, 2-
3 options were presented. In addition, continuous human 
presence in low Earth orbit was assumed, providing research 
and development opportunities via the ISS and/or 
commercial platforms throughout the timeframe. The 
commercial platform(s) were assumed to have capabilities 
similar to ISS today for the purpose of continued testing and 
demonstration. 
Table 1. Phase 1 Architecture Assumptions 
G
at
ew
ay
 
Crew duration of up to 30 days per year, augment 
Orion capability 
Support HLS - provide docking interfaces, logistics 
delivery and stowage 
Communications relay 
Utilization (science and technology demonstration) 
H
LS
 
2 crew for up to 6.5 days on the surface 
South Pole destination, crew operations during the 
daylight 
Crew live and operate out of the lander 
Mobility range of 10 km radius, based on 1 
unpressurized rover 
 
Assumptions for Phase 1: Initial Human Lunar Landing 
Architecture assumptions for phase 1 focus on returning 
humans to the Moon. These architecture assumptions are 
shown in Table 1 for Gateway and HLS.  In addition to these 
assumptions, Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) 
[6] may be leveraged to provide payloads to support the crew 
lunar mission and advance science and exploration 
objectives. Figure 2 shows an artist’s concept for the initial 
Gateway and docked HLS. 
Assumptions for Phase 2: Long-term Presence on the Lunar 
Surface 
Phase 2 will include an increase in Gateway capabilities, 
possibly including additional habitation elements, an airlock, 
and an external robotic arm. Timing of these elements will 
depend on budget availability and international partner desire 
to support Gateway activities. For lunar surface, two options 
were considered, light mobility and light habitation. The 
primary difference is whether the initial lunar surface 
habitation capability is mobile or not. Table 2 displays the 
architecture assumptions for the lunar surface for each option. 
Figure 3 displays notional elements for the phase 2 options. 
 
Figure 2. Phase 1 Gateway and Human Landing System (Artist Concept) 
 
 
Figure 3. Phase 2 Options – Light Mobility and Light Habitation (notional elements) 
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Table 2. Phase 2 Architecture Assumptions 
Li
gh
t M
ob
ili
ty
 
4 crew for up to 14 days on the surface per mission 
Crew live and operation out of 2 small pressurized 
rovers (SPRs) 
Multiple landing sites (assets relocate between crew 
missions) 
Crew translate from lander to the SPRs through a 
tunnel 
Mobility range of up to 250 km radius from crew 
lander 
Li
gh
t H
ab
ita
tio
n 
4 crew for up to 30 days on the surface per mission 
Crew live and operate out of small habitat (remains 
on lander) 
Fixed landing site 
Mobile airlock to mate with habitat to allow crew 
access to surface, requires tunnel for transfer from 
lander 
Mobility range of 20 km radius, based on 2 
unpressurized rovers 
 
Assumptions for Phase 3: Lunar Sustainability 
Phase 3 assumes no change in Gateway capabilities. For lunar 
surface, three options were considered, heavy mobility, 
heavy habitation, and hybrid habitation/mobility. The surface 
infrastructure builds upon what was assumed in phase 2 with 
additional elements to enable longer durations. Table 3 
displays the architecture assumptions for the lunar surface for 
each option. Figure 4 shows conceptual elements for the 
phase 3 options. 
Table 3. Phase 3 Architecture Assumptions 
H
ea
vy
 M
ob
ili
ty
 
4 crew for up to 60 days on the surface per mission 
Crew live and operation out of 2 small pressurized 
rovers (SPRs) and 2 mobile habitats 
Multiple landing sites (assets relocate between 
crew missions) 
Crew translate from lander to the SPRs through a 
tunnel 
Mobility range of 500+ km radius from crew 
lander 
H
ea
vy
 H
ab
ita
tio
n 
4 crew for up to 90 days on the surface per mission 
Crew live and operate out of modular habitat 
Fixed landing site 
Mobile airlock to mate with habitat to allow crew 
access to surface, requires tunnel for transfer from 
lander 
Mobility range of 20 km radius, based on 2 
unpressurized rovers 
In-situ resource utilization for oxygen production 
H
yb
rid
 
H
ab
ita
tio
n/
M
ob
ili
ty
 4 crew for up to 30 days on the surface per mission 
Crew live and operation out of 2 SPRs and 1 
habitat 
Fixed landing site 
Crew translate from lander to the SPRs through a 
tunnel 
Mobility range of up to 250 km radius from crew 
lander 
 
Assumptions for Phase 4: Shakedown and Mars Orbital 
Phase 4 leverages as much as possible from the previous 
phases in the design and operations of the Mars Spacecraft. It 
is assumed that an integrated system test is completed prior 
to the first departure of Mars. This demonstration and testing 
of the Mars Spacecraft in the cislunar environment, called the 
Mars Spacecraft Shakedown, would be the final integrated 
test prior to the next step of going to Mars. If a Mars orbital 
mission were selected, the Mars Spacecraft would have to 
support a crew for up to 1,200 days away from Earth. A crew 
of four would be accommodated for this journey with a 
contingency EVA capability. The propulsion system would 
be utilized to ferry the crew to Mars and back. One 
envisioned option, shown in Figure 5, is a hybrid propulsion 
stage [7], combining solar electric propulsion with chemical 
propulsion. The use of electric propulsion offers significant 
advantages for interplanetary missions due to its higher 
efficiency, allowing vehicles to accelerate for longer periods 
of time while expending less propellant. These systems allow 
 
Figure 4. Phase 3 Options – Heavy Mobility, Heavy 
Habitation, Hybrid Habitation/Mobility (notional 
elements) 
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a reduction in total vehicle mass compared to a spacecraft 
using an all-chemical propulsion system. Nuclear propulsion 
options are also in consideration for propulsion systems. In 
addition, a propellant tanker is assumed to refuel the Mars 
Spacecraft between missions, providing an opportunity to use 
the Mars Spacecraft for multiple missions. 
Assumptions for Phase 5: Mars Surface 
There have been many studies and approaches published on 
Mars surface architectures [8, 9]. Generally, these past 
studies point to the need to get to the surface with an entry, 
descent, and landing system, infrastructure for the crew 
surface mission, and an ascent system. Potential surface 
infrastructure include habitation, mobility, surface power, 
EVA, and in-situ resource utilization. One notional concept 
is shown in Figure 5. The Evolvable Mars Campaign was 
used as guidance for the architecture assumptions for Phase 
5 [10]. The surface architecture consisted of multiple kilo-
power units, robotic rovers, a monolithic habitat, resupply 
logistics modules, small pressurized rovers, and 
unpressurized rovers. These were placed on the Mars surface 
over a series of landings to enable a crew of four to stay up to 
500 days on the surface. 
5. CAPABILITY GAPS 
Capability gaps are classified as being in one of areas: 
• Development – Gaps that are closed through engineering 
solutions. 
• Technology – Gaps that require the development of new 
technologies in order to close. 
• Architecture – Gaps that require further refinement of 
mission plans to clarify capability needs. 
• Knowledge – Gaps that require additional scientific 
research in order to close. 
When all architecture options were considered, 270 
capability gaps were identified. The largest portion of these – 
44% - were classified as “Development Gaps,” representing 
items that were simply a matter of engineering. These items 
often described challenges with integrating components in a 
new or different way or they required existing technologies 
to undergo flight demonstration to establish gap closure.  
These mainly represent challenges that can be solved through 
formulation and implementation phases of spaceflight 
program development. Of the remaining gaps, 28% were 
classified as “Technology Gaps” requiring development of 
new technologies; 20% were “Architecture Gaps” requiring 
further refinement of mission plans to clarify the capability 
need; and the remaining 8% were “Knowledge Gaps” 
requiring scientific research for closure.   
Figure 6 summarizes the capability gaps by capability area 
and type. The Human Health, Life Support and Habitation 
Systems Capability area had the largest number of gaps, with 
a large number of these characterized as development gaps.  
A closer review revealed that approximately 20% of these 
gaps are items that called for increased reliability over the 
current state of the art in order to reduce sparing 
requirements. These items are not strictly enabling for many 
of the architectural options considered. However, if 
successful in closing these gaps, the capabilities could 
enhance the missions by reducing logistics and associated 
mass and other costs. Similarly, the majority of 
Communications, Navigation, and Orbital Debris Tracking 
and Characterization gaps were classified as development 
gaps. Of these, approximately 35% described enhancements 
that could improve interoperability with international and 
commercial partners or provide for high-quality video to 
 
Figure 5. Phase 4 Mars Spacecraft (notional elements) and Phase 5 Mars Surface Approach (notional elements) 
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Figure 6. Proposed Capability Gaps by Area and Type 
 
 
Figure 7. Proposed Technology and Development Capability Gaps 
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Figure 8. Proposed Technology Gaps by Platform Enabled 
 
 
Figure 9. Proposed Development Gaps by Platform Enabled 
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enable the public to witness the return of humans to the Moon 
and the first human landing on the Moon. 
Figure 7 traces technology and development capability gap 
closure from the required demonstration platform through the 
first platform enabled by that demonstration to the ultimate 
platform enabled by closure of the gap. The width of the lines 
corresponds to the number of gaps to be closed. In reviewing  
closure paths, it becomes clear that all of the current proposed 
platforms in NASA’s plans as of now – ISS, Orion, Gateway, 
and Lunar Surface Assets – are required to enable the 
eventual human exploration of Mars. It is also worth noting 
that 43% of these gaps can be closed on the ground and 30% 
of these gaps must be demonstrated on ISS or other potential 
LEO platforms. 79% of the technology and development gaps 
identified through this process relate to capabilities that 
ultimately enable human Mars surface missions. 
Figures 8 further examines technology gaps and the platforms 
enabled by closure of those gaps. Similarly, Figures 9 further 
examines development gaps and the platforms enabled by 
closure of those gaps. As we proceed from Gateway to the 
Lunar Surface to Mars, gaps are progressively closed at each 
platform, building up the needed capabilities and reducing the 
risk for human Mars surface missions.  
It can be observed in Figures 8 and 9 that the number of 
technology gaps for each platform are lower than the number 
of development gaps, due to the continued technology 
development efforts by NASA and other partners. 
Figure 8 demonstrates that 90% of Technology gaps for 
Human Mars Surface and 60% for Sustained Human Lunar 
are closed by activities completed on other platforms. 
Similarly, Figure 9 demonstrates that 97% of Development 
gaps for Human Mars Surface and 67% for Sustained Human 
Lunar. The “closed previously in the architecture” items for 
each platform assume a serial order of platforms to enable 
future platforms. If the architecture order is changed or 
platforms are added/removed, the gaps would need to be 
reassigned to new or existing platforms. 
The number of identified gaps are greatest for the sustained 
Lunar surface phase and the Human Mars surface phase. 
Each of these phases require the closure of a significant 
number of both technology and developmental gaps. When 
comparing the Sustained Human Lunar Surface and the 
Human Mars Surface, the number of development gaps are 
similar. This is partially due the differences application of in-
situ resource utilization gaps on the lunar surface and on the 
Mars surface. 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
For the architecture options presented in this paper, there are 
a variety of capability gaps that must to be closed. These 
include gaps relating to knowledge, technology, 
development, and architecture. The framework presented in 
this paper allows NASA to identify these capability gaps and 
to gain an understanding of what actions, including design, 
development, and testing, must be completed to enable 
potential missions during each of the identified phases.  
Although a majority of the gaps collected in the framework 
are in the areas of Human Health, Life Support and 
Habitation Systems Capability; and Communications, 
Navigation, and Orbital Debris Tracking and 
Characterization, many of the gaps can be considered 
enhancing versus enabling. The next step in the overall 
process to differentiate between these two types of gaps.  
The tracking of gaps from demonstration platform through to 
the first enabled platform and then on to further enabled 
platforms demonstrates the progression of capability 
development and gap filling between phases. It also 
demonstrates the benefit of leveraging existing and nearer 
term platforms to enable future exploration missions. For 
instance, a majority of the gap closing activities identified in 
this effort can be closed via ground testing and/or on an 
ISS/LEO platform.  
Finally, the trace from ground based activities through 
ISS/LEO, cislunar, and lunar demonstrates the necessity of 
progressive invest in technology and risk reduction in 
enabling Mars missions. Trying to fill all of the identified 
Mars gaps at once would be untenable. Alternatively, in the 
plan identified here, those capabilities are developed and 
tested over multiple phases, resulting a sustainable, 
affordable exploration plan. 
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